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Organised decentralization, uneven outcomes:  
employment relations in the Italian public health sector  
 
Abstract 
This article looks at the difficulties of adapting a very centralised employment 
relations system in a country characterised by a deep regional economic divide. 
In particular, by looking at the Italian public health sector, it is contended that 
organised decentralisation of employment relations implemented against wide 
regional differences led to uneven outcomes in second-level (organisation) 
collective bargaining. 
 
The debates on changes in the organization of healthcare in the past forty years 
and their effects on employment relations in all countries have focussed almost 
exclusively on the national level. This article aims to add a ‘regional dimension’ 
to the analysis that can be crucial in the assessment of processes and outcomes. 
The Italian public healthcare sector is chosen as case study as it is one of the 
European countries with the deepest economic divides, but also characterised by 
a highly centralised system of employment relations. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s a common feature of the transformation of 
traditional public administrations in most countries across the world has been 
that of a New Public Management-inspired trend of reforms. For public health 
systems this has meant, amongst other things, restructurings, mergers, closures 
or privatization of hospitals, cost saving re-designing of treatments and care, 
especially for non-acute patients, experimentations of mix of public and private 
providers (Bach et al., 1999; Bach and Kessler, 2011). Such changes were aimed 
primarily, at least in the discourse, at more effective control of governments’ 
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public expenditure and greater responsibilities for these organisations - hospitals 
and local health providers.  
Changes in the established systems of employment relations also took place in an 
attempt to implement allegedly more efficient, private sector-like practices. 
Degrees of decentralisation of collective bargaining (CB) to organization level, 
increases in managerial discretion, introduction of job enlargement and other 
internal labour and occupational experimentations took place in several 
countries. Despite the expectations, however, studies highlighted both limited 
success, for instance, of early attempts of performance related pay mechanisms 
for health staff at the organization level, as well as a continuing distinctiveness of 
public sector employment relations that are strictly linked to the role of political 
choices and of central government interventions (Hood, 1995; Grimshaw et al., 
2007; Bordogna, 2008; Mehaut et al., 2010; Bach and Kessler, 2011). The 
industrial relations literature showed, in particular, that straightforward 
implementation of a private sector-like model of employment relations had to 
take into account the capacity of organised social actors, such as unions and 
employers, to frustrate or promote change (Galetto et al., 2014; Greer et al., 
2013; Schulten et al., 2008).  
Health systems have also become systematically and increasingly territorially 
decentralized. Budget pressures led countries as diverse in size and approach to 
their national health systems as Italy, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Sweden, 
Denmark and partly France to engage in devolution of financial, as well as 
organisational responsibility of the healthcare provisions to subnational 
administrative units (regions, Länder, comunidades autónomas, federal states, 
etc). Similarly, territorial decentralization took place in North and South America, 
India and central Asia (Pavolini and Vicarelli, 2012). 
Given their increased involvement in healthcare planning and organization, this 
article explores what role and effects, if any, regional governments have in the 
relevant industrial relations?  While it has been established that ‘regions matter’ in 
the reform of public sector (Neri, 2006; Sarto et al., 2015, Greer et al., 2013), we 
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know less about whether and how they matter in the regulation of the labour 
relations involved in those changes. Is the role of the regional governments as 
commissioning and planning authorities to be matched by a role as employers too? 
And if so, what is the resulting relationship with the extant levels of regulation of 
employment relations? This is theoretically relevant for the study of industrial 
relations. National systems are the default unit of reference when comparing 
developments in labour relations across countries. Here, within-country 
variations are taken into consideration in the interpretation of changes and 
trends in industrial relations. Regional differences are shown to affect the access 
and quality to public services, but are rarely analysed according to their 
implications on the terms and conditions of work of healthcare staff and, in 
particular, on the institutions and the governing mechanisms that determine 
those working conditions. 
The following section introduces the case study; section two, then, drawing from 
the available, though sporadic theoretical contributions on the role of the 
regions in employment relations, outlines four possible scenarios of an 
intermediate, regional level of regulation to guide the interpretation of our 
findings; the third section describes the methodology and the findings are then 
presented in section four, followed by discussion and conclusions. 
 
1. The case of Italy: tension between national employment relations 
and regional health systems 
Across different countries, hospitals are possibly amongst the most decentralised 
public services and will be the focus of this paper. Italy is then chosen as a 
textbook example of historically wide economic regional divide contrasting with a 
very centralized system of collective bargaining.  
Italy's overall national health expenditure has remained generally under the OECD 
countries average, moving from 8% in 1990 to just under 9% of GDP in 2015 (OECD, 
2015) but with a forecast of a decrease to 6.5% by 2019, according to the Italian 
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National State Account (Corte dei Conti, 2015). At the regional level, however, there 
are significant differences in terms of how much each region allocates to healthcare 
to match nationally distributed funds, in the mix between private and public 
providers and in terms of control over such expenditure (table 1). Comparative 
research by the Quality of Government Institute in Gothenburg ranked 172 
regions in 18 European countries on the basis of, amongst other indicators, the 
quality of local government, including local health systems. Italy as a country 
ranked 10th, but amongst its regions, southern Calabria was in last position 
(172nd) while the Bolzano autonomous province ranked at a noticeable 9th place 
(Charron et al., 2012). It is therefore not surprising that Italian regional 
differences have been at the centre of widely known socio-economic analyses - 
such as for example the historical reconstruction of civic traditions by Putnam 
(1993).  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The public Italian health sector was institutionalised in 1978 and was one of the 
first in Europe to be based on the principle of ‘full democratic universalism’ 
(Ferrera, 1995). Three major reforms of the public sector in the 1990s and the 
federalist reform in 20011 represent the main turning points. Regional 
governments were increasingly made responsible for the costs and the 
organisation of healthcare. Differences in the resources available and in the mix 
of private and public providers, contributed to the creation of different ‘regional 
health systems’. Amongst the many proposed classifications, table 1 reports 
those by Formez (2007), based on the distribution of functions between hospitals 
                                                        
1 In 1992 and 1993 two reforms were implemented in the public sector and in 1999 the so-called 
‘reform-ter’ took place. These reforms promoted a company-oriented vision, making corporatization a 
key, prominent trajectory of change in the public health sector. With the 1999, general directors of 
ASL (Azienda Sanitaria Locale, local health organisations) and AOs (Azienda Ospedaliera, hospitals) 
were given full management autonomy. A full managerialisation, however, was never accomplished, 
with general directors nominated by regional governments. 
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(AOs) and local health units (ASLs), and by Neri (2006), based the forms of 
economic interactions between providers (competition between private, public, 
cooperatives, religious providers, as opposed to cooperation and integration; and 
a ‘residual’ or bureaucratic model, where organisation is constrained by financial 
problems). 
In 2005, due to the persistent serious budget problems and excessive spending of 
some regions, the national government imposed solvency schemes, or ‘recovery 
plans’ (piani di rientro). As of 2016, eight out of twenty-one2 regional health systems 
are in recovery plans (five of these are under administration, Figure 1). Recovery 
plans automatically lead to increases in regional taxes and to compulsory hiring 
freezes until financial balance is reached. Coordination across such diverse 
healthcare systems of provision is ensured by the so-called State-Regions 
Conference, which defines and monitors national minimum standards of 
patients’ care. What is increasingly fragmented and less coordinated are the 
working conditions of health staff under which such standards are met.  
The proposition therefore put forward is that compared to a highly centralised 
system of employment relations, regional governments, who finance public 
healthcare together with the central state, could become an actor of 
employment relations. Despite lacking formal and legal recognition of their role 
as ‘employer’, regional governments might find themselves in the position to 
shape the institutions and governance mechanisms of healthcare workforce. 
In the early 1990s Italy changed from a ‘sovereign employer’, where public sector 
terms and conditions of employment were centrally defined via law, to a multi-
employer bargaining system common to both private and public sectors. The 
state-employer is represented in employment negotiations by the ARAN agency 
at the national level (Agenzia Rappresentanza Negoziale nelle Pubbliche 
Amministrazioni), and by the organisations’ management at the decentralized 
level. Both private and public sectors’ systems of employment relations are 
                                                        
2 Italian regions are twenty, but the Trentino Alto Adige region is made of two ‘autonomous 
provinces’, Bozen and Trento, which account for two separate healthcare systems. 
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organized around a main central, national sector level of collective bargaining 
and a decentralized/organization level. The respective competences of collective 
bargaining of both sector and organization levels are clearly defined according to 
an ‘organised decentralisation’ process (Crouch and Traxler, 1995). The 
articulation between national and organization level of CB is achieved through 
‘demarcation’ of the respective competences. Basic terms and conditions of work 
for employees in a given sector are negotiated at the national level by 
representative employers’ and workers’ interests’ organisations. Other issues 
such as organisation of working time, allocation of productivity bonuses, part 
time schemes, annual training programmes, to name a few, are then collectively 
bargained at the organization level. The Italian system is designed to minimise 
territorial disparities in wages, especially after the so called ‘wage cages’ - 
mechanism of pay determination to align wage levels to the different cost of 
living in different regions - were abolished in 1969 (Ferrera and Gualmini, 2004). 
Since then, regional variations of wages have been opposed by the national 
unions and any emergence of mechanisms to determine wages and terms and 
conditions of work at the regional level would mark a qualitative shift in the 
employment relations system. 
‘Organised decentralisation’, of which Italy is an example, as opposed to the 
‘disorganised decentralization’, as found in the UK, has been regarded as more 
effective in ensuring a redistribution of resources underpinned by national 
solidarity on one hand and, at the same time, empowering CB at the organization 
level to adjust to employers’ local demands for competitiveness and flexibility 
(Traxler, 1995; Marginson, 2011). Significant regional differences, combined with 
increasing responsibility for healthcare financing devolved to the regional 
governments and a declining investment in healthcare expenditure at the national 
level are here looked at as possible sources of disruption to the established ‘division 
of labour’ between the national-organisation levels of CB.  
While pay bargaining continues to be determined at national level and then 
integrated by CB at the organizational level, there is abundant evidence of 
regional governments intervening in the regulation of healthcare in a way that 
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carries implications on the wider working conditions of health staff. Formally 
responsible only for the organization of healthcare delivery, regional 
governments have simultaneously found themselves in the position to intervene 
on broader workforce issues despite no legal role nor responsibility to do so. The 
economic crisis and the consequent pay freeze at national level imposed by 
austerity measures since 2009 has further exacerbated the regions’ role, as well 
as consequent, increased territorial disparities. It is therefore contended that 
while decentralization of CB in the public health sector was indeed organized, the 
resulting experiences of decentralized level CB vary greatly depending on the 
region, leading to uneven outcomes. 
 
2. Regions: an intermediate level of regulation of employment 
relations?  
The ‘fad of regionalism’ has been looked at through various lenses,  especially in 
political science, from a desire of higher level governments to escape 
responsibility for outcomes they regard as beyond their control by devolving 
decision-making authority to lower-level jurisdictions to a strategic choice, aimed 
at greater efficiency in the administration or, in the case of European countries, 
at entitlement to access the Regional Development Funds of the European Union 
(Sabel 1996; Keating and Loughlin 1997).   
In industrial relations, a regional level of regulation has known periodic revivals, 
similarly either in praise of its flexible, formal/informal nature and more effective 
intervention in local labour issues, or in the attempt to gauge its possible role in 
the process of European integration. In the analysis of industrial relations 
systems and state traditions, Crouch noted how European countries in their 
continuous and various attempts to coordinate national and local level 
bargaining, never resorted to establish a regional level as a new strategic, formal 
site for industrial relations activity (Crouch, 1993) and systems of employment 
relations have predominantly maintained a national legal framework of 
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reference. The process of European integration itself led to a legitimisation of 
mainly national level actors. Nevertheless, a role for the regions, however 
uncertain and undefined, was debated within the context of European 
integration in the early 1990s, in particular as evidence was pointing at the 
effectiveness of a regional level of intervention in solving inefficiencies of local 
labour markets (Teague 1995; Regalia 1998).  
Drawing from this body of literature, four possible scenarios resulting from a greater 
involvement of the regions in the employment relations of the healthcare sector are 
identified. A first possibility is that a regional level of intervention in employment 
regulation could ‘hollow out’ the existing national level, in the attempt to affirm 
itself as a more appropriate substitute. Despite a possibly better position in 
identifying solutions to local labour market problems, the fragmentation that would 
be generated from a regionalization of the structure of governance of labour 
markets has been put forward as a reason against its desirability within Europe 
(Teague, 1995). Within a single country this could lead to a variety of regional 
models of employment relations and undermine the solidarity on which national 
systems of CB have traditionally been based. 
A second scenario, often invoked by some public sector industrial relations scholars, 
especially in Italy, would see the regions becoming a substitute of the organization 
level of CB. An increased coordinating power of the regions would be seen as an 
effective substitute of the organization/hospital level, where the use of career 
progressions was abused and an efficient, performance-related allocation of the 
resources never really took place (Pavolini and Vicarelli, 2012; Carrieri, 2009; Alessi, 
2009; Bordogna, 2009; Bordogna and Ponzellini, 2004). Such intervention by the 
regional government could lead to a ‘squeeze’ of the organisation level of CB.  
A third scenario would entail an only occasional, on-demand shift from two- to 
three-tier arrangements, with regional governments intervening in employment 
regulations. Comparative European research during the 1990s and the early 2000s 
indicated a de facto, rather than formal role of an ‘intermediate level’ of social 
regulation (Regalia, 1998; 2006). Looking at the economically successful regions of 
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Baden-Wuttemberg, Lombardy, Catalonia and Rhone-Alpes, Regalia and colleagues 
found common patterns of relationships between regional governments and 
institutions and interests’ organisations. Overall, the experiences observed seemed 
to vary according to the local institutional systems, i.e. not simply degree of 
autonomy and scope for action but also the regional governments’ administrative 
styles (‘their willingness to provide space for interaction with interest organisations, 
in particular the unions’) (Regalia, 1998: 163). The advantage observed by this 
additional level of possible, though never formal(ised), coordination is that of 
flexibility and adaptability, counterweighted by the weakness of poor coordination 
and discontinuity.  
A fourth scenario is that regional governments do not play any role in the regulation 
of employment relations of healthcare despite their increased involvement in 
financing and organising it. In his evaluation of the public sector reforms and the 
approval of the ‘regionalist’ Constitution3, Zoppoli (2008) highlights that there has 
been a polarization of the functions of the two employment relations levels, with a 
centralised control of expenditure for staff and update of terms and conditions of 
work (pay and contributions, regulation around work organisation) and a 
decentralised level for the flexible utilisation of work that have concrete, strong 
effect on the actual organisation of administration. Regional governments, according 
to this view, do not enter the scene as actors of the public sector industrial relations. 
To summarise, if the increased financial role of the regional governments in 
healthcare provision is to correspond to a greater role in employment relations, this 
could end up replacing one of the two established levels of collective regulation of 
work relations, national (scenario one) or decentralized (scenario two); the regional 
level could become an additional level of regulation of employment relations 
(scenario three), in particular when perceived as necessary or strategic by the 
regional government; or, finally, the regions might not ‘interfere’ in the regulation of 
the workforce in the absence of any formal provision to do so (scenario four). 
                                                        
3 
Reference to the so-called ’federalist’ reform of 2001. Title V of the Italian Constitution was reformed 
to give greater legislative and administrative powers to the local authorities, in particular to the 
regions. 
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3. Research design and methods  
To investigate the possible role of regional governments as potential new actors 
of employment relations, systematic data were collected to map the use of 
regional additional resources allocated to the health expenditure according to its 
potential impact on employment relations matters. The focus is on nurses and 
allied health professions in particular, which are usually the largest professional 
groups. In Italy they account for 41% of the health staff. 273,000 staff, 77% of 
which are women, out of a total of 665,000 public health sector employees , in 
2011. Medics and managers are covered by different national collective 
agreements and are not included in the study. The challenging situation of nurses 
and health staff (e.g. shortage, especially in some northern regions; job 
enlargement; overtime; requests for part time work, etc.) provided a good 
starting point to analyse how these issues were more effectively dealt with at the 
different levels of employment regulation available. 
The research is based on in depth interviews with key actors of the public 
healthcare sector industrial relations at national and regional level carried out 
between 2011 and 2016 and on a close examination of available documentation. 
As reported in detail in table 2, data were derived from the analysis of a 
substantial amount of documents ranging from sector and organisation level 
work collective agreements for the health staff (comparto), to regional accounts 
(including minutes of meetings between the regional governments and the 
respective local health councils - assessorati regionali alla sanità), regional 
healthcare plans (which are often drafted in consultation, not negotiation, with 
social partners) and national reports of the State Accountancy Office. This was 
aided and complemented by a five-year (2011-2016) systematic and extensive 
review of academic research, press and articles in specialized websites and 
centres of study of health management. Scholars and experts in public sector 
employment relations were contacted and interviewed. Finally, based on 
purposive sampling aimed at strengthening the conceptual validity of the study 
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(Miles et al. 2014), the Lombardy region was selected for a deeper insight and 
interviews were conducted with regional social partners in 2011. Lombardy’s 
higher public health expenditure, compared to all other regions, and the extent 
of changes in healthcare organization implemented since the federalist reform 
make it an interesting case of how far healthcare can change from the national, 
pre-federalist ‘norm’ and whether this has led the regional government to act as 
employer and/or somehow intervene in workforce-related issues.  
Further interviews with three of the national most representative union 
organisations and academic experts were conducted at the end of 2015 to share 
and discuss the interpretation of the five-year research (2010-2015). The 
nineteen interviews have all been transcribed and manually coded. 
The approach taken was to track individual regions' specific interventions in health 
staff matters. All twenty-one regional models were looked at in detail in the 
preliminary desk research.  
 
[Table 2 - here] 
 
Organised decentralization, uneven outcomes?  
As anticipated, regional governments often found themselves involved in workforce 
planning and governance issues. The examples below highlight how their 
interventions, while not dealing directly with pay matters, have been indirectly 
shaping the outcomes of collective bargaining at the decentralised level. 
Table 3 summarises the findings according to the four scenarios of possible relation 
between the regional intervention in staff matters and the existing levels of CB.  
A first, prominent divide in the way that regional interventions related to established 
levels of collective bargaining is based on the economic conditions of the regional 
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health systems.  
[Table 3 – here] 
 
The well-performing regions 
Amongst the better performing regions, Lombardy, Friuli Venezia Giulia and Veneto 
have been found to allocate regularly substantial additional resources to address 
explicitly workforce planning issues. The resulting interrelation with the national and 
decentralised levels of CB, however, falls under different scenarios. 
Scenario 1 – ‘Hollowing out’ of the national level 
Lombardy is the only region to have implemented the option to open the market of 
healthcare to ‘any willing provider’. This led to the presence of a mix of public and 
private organisations in the regional health system, defined as a ‘competition model’ 
(table 1, classification by Neri, 2006). As a result, this regional health system is the 
one that perhaps changed most radically from the pre-federalist reform. The 
documentary analysis and the interviews show that the Lombardy regional 
government invested in accommodation for nurses (particularly in Milan, where the 
cost of living is higher than the regional and national average) so as to attract 
employees from outside the region. Following ad hoc consultations with regional 
level social partners, the regional government also allocated money to increase the 
average salary of nurses and allied professionals to deal with the problem of staff 
shortage. Interestingly, with regards to the amount of the basic wage increase, what 
the regional directorate described as ‘peanuts’, was referred to as ‘a lot’ by the trade 
union regional representatives interviewed. The documentary analysis confirmed the 
will of Lombardy regional government to intervene directly, if needed, to the 
solution of workplace conflicts. The local press reported an example of a dispute 
over the merger of a number of hospitals in the early 2000s, among which the big 
Ospedale Maggiore in Milan. The negotiations between the social partners stalled 
over the compensation for the staff being moved during the merge. Management 
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were concerned with the tight budget until the Lombardy regional government 
intervened assuring financial coverage to facilitate the operation.  
All social partners interviewed in Lombardy, except, to an extent, the regional official 
of Cgil (the left-oriented union), agreed on the desirability of greater independence 
from central government in terms of scope for action in employment regulation. This 
was argued in particular with reference to the greater flexibility in the involvement 
of private providers and introduction of performance related pay as an incentive tool 
for health staff. The message of the regional government directorate was that 
greater autonomy in personnel relations at a regional level would ensure greater 
flexibility in the organisation of healthcare provision. An example mentioned during 
the interview was the attempt to outsource the dental service of the San Paolo 
hospital, in Milan, which was eventually blocked by the unions opposing 
fragmentation of the staff and service. This could have been more easily achieved, 
the representative of the regional directorate said, if public employment relations 
arrangements had been ‘lighter’, not ‘dictated’ from the central level. All partners 
interviewed recognized the advantage of a relatively stable, centre-right regional 
government and the consequent building up of ‘keen-to-compromise’ employment 
relations. The national level of CB was referred to as ‘interfering’ also by the regional  
officials of Cisl (the centre-left, Catholic-oriented union), arguing on the greater 
consistency needed between industrial relations and regional healthcare model. 
From the point of view of the Cgil regional representative a ‘contractual federalism’ 
could have been functional rather than desirable, in that it could potentially 
recompose fragmented terms and conditions of staff employed by different 
providers in the sector such as religious hospitals and cooperatives. Some of these 
organisations were said to be looking to ‘escape’ the constraints of the national 
public healthcare sector collective agreement and wanting to apply the national 
collective agreements of the service sector or that of the cooperatives.  
The natural evolution in this case would be towards a ‘hollowing out’ of the national 
level of CB and a greater prominence of a regional level of intervention to respond 
more effectively to the specific regional health system implemented.  
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Scenario 2 – Squeeze the organisational level of CB 
Amongst the financially healthy regions, only in one case a squeeze of the 
organisational level of CB has been noted. The healthcare directorate of the Marche 
region signed an ad hoc agreement in December 2013 with the regional public 
health sector unions (Cgil, Cisl and Uil) on the stabilization of 1,200 temporary 
workers. The hospitals and local organisations in the Marche region are grouped 
under a single Local Health Organisation so that the CB at the decentralised level 
coincides with the regional level. Though this unification has been pursued in name 
of greater organizational efficiency, and despite overall cooperative relations 
between the social partners, trade unions have expressed concerns and criticisms 
that such grouping has led to a ‘disempowerment’ of the CB at the decentralized, 
organisational level.  
Scenario 3 – From two- to three-tier (on demand) CB 
The regional additional resources of the north-eastern regions of Veneto and Friuli 
Venezia Giulia have often been referred to in the specialized media as being above 
national average. Veneto recently allocated 200 million Euros in two years explicitly 
to reinforce the territorial services, by hiring more General Practitioners, have them 
work longer hours and cover more shifts. Friuli Venezia Giulia committed 9 million 
Euros as incentives for nurses and allied professions to work unsocial hours (night 
shifts, holidays and weekends). In particular, it was established by the regional 
government, 7 million were to be managed via CB at the organisation level to cover 
critical areas such as staffing of A&E departments, reduction of waiting lists, 
prevention of work accidents, project for innovative organisational models and 
clinical governance. Though resources are allocated by the regional government, it is 
then down to CB at the hospital level to allocate them in line with the needs of 
specific services. In one of the cases, the Santa Maria degli Angeli hospital of 
Pordenone, in the Friuli Venezia Giulia region, has established that the computer-
assisted tomography could start to be performed by health staff only, without 
medics having to be present. This ‘job enlargement’ for health staff had the objective 
to reduce waiting lists and optimize the use of the technology and equipment. Such 
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flexible utilization of the workforce became ‘affordable’ thanks to the additional 
resources made available by the Friuli Venezia Giulia, but found opposition in other 
regions where no economic incentive was offered in exchange of the proposed job 
enlargement.  
Friuli Venezia Giulia and Veneto allocate additional regional resources to improve 
public health services and gives indications on where they should be invested, but 
the decentralised level of CB retains discretion in defining the details of such 
investments in the relevant hospital. It would appear as an ‘on demand three-tier 
system’: to ensure the achievement of macro-objectives established at regional 
level, the regional governments allocate resources to facilitate the relative 
employment adjustments, such as the mentioned resources to cover overtime, re-
organisation of shifts, job enlargement.  
In an official meeting with social partners, the Umbria regional government also 
declared itself available to act as facilitator in staffing matters that could arise with 
the implementation of the regional healthcare system. In May 2013, the regional 
social partners in Umbria signed a ‘regional agreement on industrial relations’, 
where the regional government committed to be part of the ‘bargaining, 
concertation, consultation, information and joint analysis’ of any effects on 
employment of possible organisational changes of the regional health system.  
The examples above show how regional governments are participating in the 
shaping of working conditions in a flexible, ad hoc and rather variable fashion.   
Scenario 4 – no intervention 
Tuscany and Emilia Romagna are often referred to as exemplars of efficient cost 
control and public health expenditure. They have established joint initiatives to 
continue learning from each other and share best healthcare practices. There is little 
evidence of either direct or indirect forms of intervention in the mechanisms of 
workforce regulation by these regional governments. There is indeed evidence of 
numerous activities aimed at the improvement of territorial healthcare assistance (in 
Tuscany this has been achieved, amongst other things, with the grouping of some 
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ASLs under ‘wide-area units’, in order to optimise and share the cost of common 
services) and of the excellence of some local organisations and hospitals (for 
instance, in November 2013 the ASL of Ferrara received a ‘Public Administration 
Award’). A spoke person of the National Agency for Health services (Agenas) 
commented on the great capacity of individual ASLs in Emilia Romagna ‘to plan and 
make decisions on their priorities in terms of care, and decide what to cut’.  
The cases of Tuscany and Emilia Romagna show that the regional governments are 
indeed engaged in the continuous improvement of the regional healthcare service, 
but trust the CB at the decentralised, hospital level to address the needed 
workforce-related adjustments. There is a full recognition of the role and 
independence of the organisational level of CB. The material and the interviews 
collated for this study tell a story of continuity in the established division of roles 
between unions, employers and local communities that leave the regions of Tuscany 
and Emilia Romagna less concerned about the minutiae of the expenditure and its 
redistribution to the workforce. 
 
The regions in recovery plans 
Significantly different are the regions under recovery plans, though within this 
cluster too there are important distinctions.  
For Campania, Calabria, Lazio and Sicily the block of turnover and a minimized scope 
of CB at decentralized level have been constant features for more than a decade. 
The complexity of these cases would require a specific focus on each individual 
region but for the purpose of this work a relevant, common characteristic is a catch-
22 situation in which the lack of financial resources led to hiring freezes, which led to 
a massive recourse to overtime and temporary workers and an increase in 
expenditure. Such issues would normally fall under the competence of organisation 
level CB, but the financial restraints of the regions in recovery plans have hampered 
negotiations between the relevant social partners.  
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At the ASL of Avellino, in the Campania region, some 273,000 Euros were due to 
medics for the overtime worked between 2011 and 2012 to deliver minimum 
healthcare services. Doctors were refused payments by the organisation and 
compensation only arrived following a decision of the Employment Tribunal that 
forced the regional government to pay the hours worked. Another example is the 
ASL of Naples, one of the largest in Europe in terms of remit, which had to undergo a 
substantial staff reduction between 1993 and 2011, causing an extraordinary use of 
overtime from nurses and doctors and an increasing recourse to temporary 
contracts. Temporary workers gradually became eligible to be made permanent. This 
then led to various disruptions, from staff migrating to other regions attracted by a 
permanent contract, to disputes with the regional directorate and stoppages at 
workplace level.  
Alarmingly low staffing levels, jeopardising the delivery of minimum care standards, 
were also the cause of a temporary, symbolic occupation by the employees of the 
hospital Dell’Annunziata, in Cosenza (Calabria) in January 2014. Attempts of the local 
unions to open negotiations with the management were forcibly ended, as the 
hospital director declared him/herself to be ‘trapped’ by the lack of resources 
imposed by the regional government.  
A similar, severe limitation in the use of resources at the local level imposed by the 
recovery plans is experienced in Lazio where social partners at the regional level 
recurrently, but unsuccessfully, tried to establish social dialogue at regional level to 
address similar workforce issues. The delays in solving the regional financial debts is, 
once again, preventing a solution to the poor economic conditions of healthcare 
staff. 
There are other regions under recovery plans that have been more effective in 
establishing some forms of social dialogue as a modus operandi or in finding ways to 
‘recover’. In Sicily, according to the national level union representatives interviewed, 
regional social partners are being consulted in the decisions concerning the recovery 
plan. However, this often entails a simple communication from the regional 
government of the redundancies involved in the plan. In Piedmont, an agreement 
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between the regional government and the social partners has been recently signed 
to formalize the will of the region to engage with possible effects of the restructuring 
(i.e. minimize job losses) that may become necessary to control the expenditure. 
The main effect of shifting responsibilities to the regions to recover health 
expenditure debts has been of a ‘squeeze’ of the organisation level CB (scenario two) 
and has prevented it from proposing solutions tailored to the local needs. The dis-
empowerment of ASLs and AOs had already been pointed at as a possible cause of 
the failure of recovery plans implemented in Campania, where targets have been 
imposed to all health organisations, regardless of the individual characteristics and 
needs (Cuccurullo et al., 2010: 234).  
On the other hand, the national union representatives and the experts on 
employment relations in the health sector interviewed unanimously highlighted past 
negative experiences of CB at organisation level in the regions currently under 
recovery plans. This may have de-legitimised social partners as participants in 
today’s decision making arena. Mis-management at the organisational level, both of 
operations and of employment relations, was considered a key factor responsible for 
the escalating financial debt of the regions. Cases of corruption in the purchase of 
services and equipment for local hospitals have been common in the past and are 
still, not infrequently, coming to the fore in discussions on the causes of the regional 
economic divide (Pavolini, 2011). Though such scandals are common across Italy4, 
they happen to be more frequent in the South. The use of public employment as a 
channel of political consensus has interfered not only with the distribution of 
resources via CB at organisational level, but also with the possibility to build a 
tradition of more cooperative employment relations at the decentralised level. The 
difficulties for the second-level of CB seem particularly acute in the regions that are 
under administration. The same limited capacity of decentralised CB is found in the 
Italian private sector too (Negrelli and Pulignano, 2008).  
                                                        
4 Lombardy 
 is overall regarded as a success case, but has also been often in the focus of public and media 
attention for big scale scandals in the healthcare sector. 
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Discussion 
The research showed that the increased role of Italian regional governments in 
contributing to the planning of healthcare provision led to changes in the 
shaping of employment relations in the public healthcare sector. The organised 
decentralisation of the employment relations in this sector has been intercepted 
by the process of decentralisation of responsibilities for healthcare expenditure 
to the regional governments. As a result, while pay and minimum terms and 
conditions of work are still determined by the national sector collective 
agreement, the outcomes of the decentralized level of CB are strongly influenced 
by the relevant regional healthcare system. Regional governments have at times 
willingly intervened in financing and regulating staffing levels, or imposing 
redundancies to keep the books in order, adjusting wage levels or freezing pay, 
unilaterally or via ad hoc consultations with social partners. The findings 
underscore that the role regional governments can play appears to be dependent 
first of all on the economic performance of the region itself and, secondly, on the 
way its healthcare system has been organized.  
Lombardy proved an interesting example. Where health expenditure is high and the 
chosen mode of healthcare delivery deviates significantly from the public healthcare 
system around which the employment relations system was originally designed, the 
intervention of the region in employment matters is likely to be particularly 
prominent. We saw that in the attempt to accommodate the presence of a greater 
variety of providers within its new ‘competition-based model’, the regional 
government intervened in disputes that stood in the way of financially advantageous 
deals for the main investor (the region itself) and increased basic pay to address 
inefficiencies of the labour market such as nurses shortage. Discretion in the 
regulation of employment matters and a ‘hollowing out’ of the central level 
(scenario one), was felt as desirable by the regional government representative 
interviewed. The risk of fragmentation highlighted by Teague (1995) is here 
confirmed.  Should a regional government replace the national level of CB, there 
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would be a risk of greater regional fragmentation and a further, amplified divide in 
healthcare performance within the country. On the other hand, the increased 
marketization of healthcare experimented in Lombardy has itself produced a 
fragmented workforce, with nurses and health care staff working sometimes in the 
same unit but under different arrangements corresponding to different employers 
(private, public, religious, cooperative, service sector). Interestingly, some unions 
declared themselves in favour of a regional level of coordination, rather than a single 
national collective agreement, on the basis that it could guarantee better internal 
harmonization. The principle of national solidarity, on the basis of which ‘wage 
cages’ were abolished forty years ago, seems today less sustainable to an 
increasingly wider range of stakeholders. 
Relatively wealthy Friuli Venezia Giulia and Veneto intervene ‘on demand’ in 
workforce-related matters if needed, but still value the role of a national level of 
collective bargaining. Consistent with what Regalia and colleagues (1998) found, in 
these two cases the regional governments seem to take advantage of the flexibility 
and adaptability of a possible regional level of regulation when needed and show an 
administrative style open to social dialogue. Coordination amongst different, 
neighbouring regions is also seen as functional to the achievement of efficiency, but 
not as central in the development of long-term strategy. While this partly confirms 
the tendency observed in ‘dynamic’ regions across different European countries 
(Regalia et al. 1998) it is found to be a viable option also in regions less well-
performing, like Sicily and, to an extent, Puglia and Piedmont. Here too, an on-
demand three-tier type of employment regulation (scenario three) was resorted to 
in order to face the organizational difficulties of the recovery plan.  
In cases of financial constraints, such as in the regions under recovery plan, it was 
observed that the regional governments became, though perhaps not intending to, 
prominent actors of healthcare employment relations. The debt of Calabria, Lazio 
and Campania alone account for two-thirds of the entire national healthcare debt 
and they have been under administration for more than a decade. The research 
showed how this has led to a frustration of the governance capacity of the 
employment relations institutions in place. In particular, the effect of the tight 
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budget control has led to a ‘squeeze’ of the decentralized level of collective 
bargaining which, in turn, hugely affected the increasingly poor working conditions 
of health staff. Though more research would be needed, the greater efficiency of a 
regional level, instead of a decentralized one, envisaged in the scenario two, is 
debatable. Amongst the regions that are not under recovery plan, Marche is another 
example where the region has come to overlap with the organization level. The small 
size of the region is likely to have facilitated such situation and, in this case, it 
seemed justified by a search for greater efficiency.  
The remaining ten regions raise questions about the proposition that regional 
governments would come to play a direct role in regional healthcare employment 
relations by virtue of their greater financial involvement. The analysis of the 
documentation of Tuscany and Emilia Romagna show how their substantial 
investments in improving the regional healthcare systems do not include any direct 
interventions on the workforce. The additional regional resources are managed at 
the organizational level and the division of competences between CB at the two 
levels is preserved. Indeed, formal procedures did not change as a result of the 
greater planning and commissioning role of the regions. However, in terms of 
territory, population and healthcare workforce, changes (scenarios from 1 to 3) have 
affected the majority of the country5. The extent to which regions have intervened 
in employment relations matters affected both the processes and the substantial 
outcomes of the established levels of collective bargaining, the decentralised one 
in particular, with effects on the access to care for a substantial share of the 
population, as well as with effects on the working conditions of the majority of 
staff involved. 
 
Conclusion 
The research highlighted that although a new, regional level of CB has not been 
                                                        
5 Nearly half of the Italian population lives in Lombardy, Lazio, Campania, Sicily and Veneto alone (30 
million out of 60). 
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formally recognised, in some cases, as a result of their increased involvement in the 
organisation and financing of local healthcare, regional governments have 
intervened - unilaterally, with ad hoc consultations or indirectly, as in the regions 
under recovery plans - in the substantive regulations of employment relations 
leading to rather uneven outcomes of its ‘organised decentralisation’. This research, 
in particular, shows how the role of CB at the decentralized level was stretched in 
opposite directions: towards a further empowering in the better performing regions, 
and, by contrast, towards a frustration of its potential role in the health 
organisations of the less-well performing regions. This is of wider significance in 
terms of the diversified effects that nationally rolled out reforms can have on 
employment relations at the sub-national level. In particular, the combination of a 
centralised employment relations system faced with deep economic regional divides 
can undermine the effectiveness of the ‘division of work’ between national and 
decentralised levels of CB.  
If the literature on the effects of NPM-inspired reforms on industrial relations show 
that we need to take into account the capacity of the organized relevant social 
actors to promote or frustrate change, the analysis of the effects of the concomitant 
territorial decentralization of public healthcare services shows that two other 
elements should be considered when assessing possible outcomes in terms of 
workforce governance. One is the possible effect of differences in economic 
performance of different regions or territorial units and, secondly, the degree of 
organisational change in the re-organisation of healthcare provision.   
Only in one case, the shaping of what could be looked at as a new, regional level of 
industrial relations has been observed: Lombardy. It is the region that shows both 
the highest financial investment in healthcare and that has re-organised the 
provision of the service in a way that deviates the most from the original, pre-
federalist reform.  
In the rest of the ‘well-performing’ regions, whether with or without the mediation 
of the regional government, the decentralized level was further ‘empowered’ in its 
responsibility to deliver healthcare and manage the human resources associated 
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with it. By contrast, the financial difficulties of the ‘less-well performing’ regions 
acted as a bottleneck of the resources, ending up frustrating the project to give 
greater management responsibility to the organisations (‘corporatisation’) 
introduced with the reforms of the 1990s. The situation of regions going through 
financial hardship is much more diversified and has confirmed the importance of the 
role of national level CB in guaranteeing a minimum level of protection that would 
have been otherwise undermined by the severe cuts of resources to the local 
healthcare staff. An example of this emerged in the second round of interviews, 
which highlighted how the CB freeze in place since 2009 in the whole public sector as 
a form of austerity has more severely affected the workforce in the regions already 
struggling for resources.   
The objective of a more efficient control of expenditure can be achieved to varying 
extents according to the resources and preferences of different territories in a given 
country. The transfer of responsibility in organising and financing healthcare from 
the national to the regional level needs to take into account the capacity of the 
regional governments to provide sufficient resources and to trust local organisations 
and their workforce in the implementation of the changes involved. Regions that will 
want to deviate more in the way they provide healthcare from the national model of 
health are found to seek greater discretion also in the management of the relevant 
workforce, undermining the established levels of regulation of employment relations 
but also the rationale of nationally-designed reform policies.  
The case of Italy shows how a multi-tier industrial relations system can ensure a 
distribution of competences, even in cases of deep regional differences: minimum 
standards are guaranteed across the national territory via national sector level CB. 
This had the advantage of counter-weighing the inequalities caused by the increased 
decentralisation for health staff. On the other hand, however, CB at the organisation 
level had different outcomes in different regions. While the Italian industrial 
relations system was designed to minimise territorial differences, de facto, 
disparities in working conditions persist.  
 24 
Further research on individual regional health systems, possibly across different 
countries, could shed light on various trajectories of change not only in terms of 
quality of service for the patients but also of quality of working life for the staff 
involved. This seems all the more relevant in times of economic crisis, when public 
expenditure, that of healthcare in particular, becomes a tool to correct public 
national debts. 
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Table 1. Selected key characteristics of the twenty-one Italian regional health 
systems 
Region Regional Health 
system 
 
(Classification by 
Formez 2007)* 
Regional Health system 
 
(Classification by Neri 
2006) ** 
Share of public 
beds (in %) 
 
(Formez 2007) 
% of HS funding 
coming from 
regional 
taxation 
(Formez 2007) 
Piedmont Mixed (integrated) (integration) 80 41.9 
Valle d’Aosta Integrated (integration) 100 40.4 
Lombardy Separated Competition  80 60.8 
Bolzano 
Trento 
Integrated (integration) 87 41.1 
Integrated (integration) 82 41.6 
Veneto Integrated Integration 94 49.1 
Friuli Venetia Giulia Mixed (integrated) Integration 89 40.9 
Liguria Mixed (integrated) (integration) 99 33.6 
Emilia-Romagna Mixed (integrated) Cooperation 78 48.8 
Tuscany Mixed (integrated) Cooperation 86 39.9 
Umbria Mixed (integrated) (integration) 93 30.8 
Marche Mixed (integrated) (integration) 85 39.0 
Lazio Mixed (separated) Bureaucratic  70 52.4 
Abruzzo Integrated Bureaucratic 85 27.5 
Molise Integrated Bureaucratic 89 12.0 
Campania Mixed (separated) Bureaucratic 70 21.1 
Puglia Mixed (integrated) Bureaucratic (integration) 86 23.7 
Basilicata Mixed (integrated) Bureaucratic 98 11.2 
Calabria Mixed (integrated) Bureaucratic 68 10.0 
Sicily Mixed (separated) Bureaucratic (some 
competition) 
79 23.9 
Sardinia Integrated (integration) 81 28.9 
ITALY   81 39.6 
Sources: Formez (2007) and Neri (2006) 
* Integrated: Hospitals are under the direction of the local health unit (ASL); Separated: Hospitals 
and local health units are independent from each other; Mixed (integrated): both integrated and 
separated options are available but with a tendency to integration of functions of hospitals and 
local health units; Mixed (separated): both integrated and separated options are available but 
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with a tendency to separation of functions between hospitals and local health units. 
** Competition: public, private, religious and not-for-profit providers are made competing for the 
provision of health services to the regional government; Cooperation: public, private, religious 
and not-for-profit providers cooperate in the provision of health services; Integration: the public 
provision of health services can be complemented by providers of different nature; Bureaucratic: 
financial constraints limit alternatives available and experimentations. 
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Table 2. Data collection  
 Name Details Years 
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Interviews 
 
(semi-structured 
interviews; duration 
from 45 minutes to 2 
hours; transcribed and 
manually coded) 
- Cgil Sanità  
- Cisl Sanità  
- UIL Sanità  
- Cgil Sanità  
- Cisl Sanità  
- ARAN Sanità  
- Lombardy Sanità 
- CERGAS  
- Experts  
- national level 
- national level 
- national level, telephone interview 
- regional level, Lombardy 
- regional level, Lombardy x 2 
- national bargaining agent x 2 
- regional healthcare officer  
- Researcher of CERGAS (Bocconi University, 
Milan) 
- Academic experts on ER in the public health 
sector x 3 
2010–2011 
- Cgil Sanità  
- Cisl Sanità  
- Experts  
- national level, telephone interview x 2 
- national level, telephone interview 
- Academic experts on ER in the public health 
sector x 3 
2015-2016 
Collective agreements 
(CAs) of the public 
health sector 
 
CCNL (Contratti Collettivi 
Nazionali del Lavoro) and the 
‘Coordinated Text’ 2010 
- individual National Labour Collective Agreements 
since early 2000s (CA 2002-2005 (and related 
economic renewals 2002/2003 and CA 
2004/2005); 2006-2009 (and related economic 
renewals 2006/2007 and 2008/2009)); 
- The ‘Coordinated Text’ collects in a single text all 
changes and updates of all items of the national 
collective agreements of the sector, in this case 
from 1994 to 2009; 
2000-2010 
Collective agreements 
at organizational level 
Relevant ‘integrative collective 
agreements’ at hospital or local 
health organisation level 
Where believed useful (usually as a follow up on 
specific instances of relevant initiatives at 
organization/hospital level) the organization level 
collective agreements were looked at  
(13 hospital level CAs in total) 
2010-2015 
Regional health plans 
(programmatic 
documents of regional 
health plans drafted by 
the regional 
governments, 
sometimes in 
consultation – not 
negotiation – with 
relevant social 
Systematic review of individual 
regions’ health plans 
Review of latest regional health plans – these were 
often associated with further ‘reforms’ or 
‘projects’ documents that were therefore 
analysed. 
2010-2015 
(or most 
recent 
available) 
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partners) 
Reports and updates 
from national official 
offices’ websites 
National Account Office (Corte 
dei conti) 
National central audit office 
2013-2016 
AGENAS (Agenzia Nazionale per 
i Servizi Sanitari Regionali) 
Non-profit national body that monitors regional 
health systems performance by collecting and 
presenting evidence on trends of expenditure 
mainly 
2010-2015 
Conferenza Stato-Regioni Permanent consultation body on implementation 
of the federalist reform 
  
ARAN (Agenzia Rappresentanza 
Negoziale) 
The negotiating body on behalf of the state in the 
public sector collective bargaining. Amongst other 
things, it publishes reports on public sector 
employees and national level collective bargaining 
Review of online news 
from healthcare sector 
dedicated websites 
and groups 
Osservatorio Sanità Daily news website linked to Ministry of Health 
and Federsanità  
2010-2015 
Sole24Ore Sanità Special weekly issue of the main Italian financial 
newspaper on the healthcare system 
2010-2015 
Cittadinanza Attiva Sanità Citizen and healthcare users-based interests group 
that monitors and carries out enquiries on the 
healthcare sector, has recently introduced an 
‘Observatory on the effects of federalism in 
healthcare’ (Osservatorio Civico su Federalismo in 
Sanità) 
2015-2016 
Reports from 
specialized research 
centres 
CERGAS (Centro di Ricerche 
sulla Gestione dell’Assistenza 
Sanitaria e Sociale, Bocconi 
University, Milan) 
Bocconi University-based research centre that 
publishes yearly report on healthcare system 
performance via its ‘Observatory on healthcare 
organisations’ (OASI, Osservatorio Aziende 
Sanitarie Italiane) 
2007-2015 
CREA Sanità (Consorzio per la 
Ricerca Economica Applicata in 
Sanità) 
National research institute publishes regular 
reports on regional healthcare systems 2014-2015 
MeS Lab (Laboratorio 
Management e Sanità, Istituto 
Superiore di Pisa)  
Pisa-based academic research center on 
Healthcare Management 2012-2015 
OECD ‘Health at a Glance’ 
2005-2015 
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Table 3. Role of the regional government in the employment relations of their 
healthcare systems 
 ‘Hollow out’ 
national level 
(scenario one) 
‘Squeeze’ local level 
(scenario two) 
From two- to three-
tier (on demand) 
(scenario three) 
No regional 
intervention in ER 
matters (scenario four) 
Regions under 
recovery plans  
 
(and under 
administration) 
  
 
Calabria 
Campania 
Lazio 
Piedmont 
Sicily 
Puglia 
Abruzzo 
Molise 
 
 
Well-performing 
regions 
 
Lombardy 
 
Marche 
 
Friuli VG 
Veneto 
Umbria 
 
Tuscany  
Emilia Romagna 
Valle d’Aosta 
Bolzano 
Trento 
Liguria 
Sardinia  
Basilicata 
 
 
 
 
